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PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL:  THE MARBURY 
PROBLEM AND THE MADISON SOLUTIONS 
Jed Handelsman Shugerman* 
 
[Marbury’s] appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal 
rights, which are protected by the laws of his country.  To withhold his 
commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, 
but violative of a vested legal right. 
—Chief Justice John Marshall1 
INTRODUCTION 
This sentence from Marbury v. Madison2 is both a potential argument 
against the unitary executive theory of total executive removal power . . . and 
in favor of it.  Why was William Marbury’s office as justice of the peace 
irrevocable?  Why didn’t President Thomas Jefferson just fire Marbury and 
moot this case?  On the other hand, this sentence also seems to tell us that 
“vested” rights are irrevocable, so perhaps vested powers are also irrevocable 
(or “indefeasible” by Congress and not conditional by legislation)? 
Here is another sentence relying on this absolutist connotation of “vested”:  
“Under our Constitution, the ‘executive Power’—all of it—is ‘vested in a 
President,’ who must ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”3 
In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,4 which 
struck down protections for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 
(CFPB) single agency head, Chief Justice Roberts opened his constitutional 
analysis with that sentence.  Recent historical work, much of it highlighted 
in this Symposium, has been unpacking the assumptions about unitary 
executive power and exclusive presidential removal power reflected in this 
ahistorical sentence by Chief Justice Roberts.  Article II’s Vesting Clause,5 
 
*  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  This Essay was prepared for the 
Symposium entitled The Federalist Constitution, hosted by the Fordham Law Review on 
October 2, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law.  This article benefitted greatly from 
the Symposium and its organizers Jonathan Gienapp, John Mikhail, Richard Primus, and 
David Schwartz, as well as Saul Cornell, Blake Emerson, Martin Flaherty, Daniel Hulsebosch, 
Thomas Lee, Ethan Leib, Andrew Kent, Jane Manners, Lev Menand, and Julian Mortenson.  
I also thank Michael Albalah and Fordham librarian Jacob Fishman for research assistance.  
 1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803). 
 2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 3. Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191 (2020) (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3). 
 4. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
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the Take Care Clause,6 and the “Decision of 1789”7 do not accomplish what 
Chief Justice Roberts assumes that they do:  establish an exclusive, 
indefeasible presidential removal power. 
This Essay summarizes recent historical research, especially by Professors 
Jane Manners and Lev Menand, on the breakthrough solution hidden in plain 
sight in Marbury.  Marbury also hints at two problems (first, the question of 
judicial offices versus executive offices; and second, the little word “vest”), 
but I summarize how Madison (not as a defendant in 1801–03 but as leader 
of the House of Representatives in 1789) solves these problems, too. 
Unitary executive theory depends on the exclusivity of executive power to 
deny a role for Congress to set conditions on removal of officers, to reject 
congressional and judicial oversight, or to otherwise limit presidential power.  
Unitary theorists often attempt to squeeze exclusivity back into the text of 
the Constitution, despite glaring gaps and textual problems.  In his Morrison 
v. Olson8 dissent arguing that the independent counsel statute9 infringed on 
the presidential removal power, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote of the Vesting 
Clause:  “[T]his does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the 
executive power.”10  A century ago, Chief Justice William Howard Taft 
made a similar textual insertion of the word “alone” into Article II’s Vesting 
Clause in Myers v. United States.11  Unitary scholars also insert “all” into 
Article II’s Vesting Clause.  For example, Professors Steven Calabresi and 
Saikrishna Prakash contend that “Article II’s vesting of the President with all 
of the ‘executive Power’ [unambiguously] give[s] him control over all 
federal governmental powers that are neither legislative nor judicial.”12  They 
further note that the “Constitution . . . gives an exclusive grant of all of the 
executive power to the President alone.”13  The Office of Legal Counsel’s 
 
 6. Id. § 3, cl. 1. 
 7. The Decision of 1789 refers to “the First Congress’ vigorous debate about the removal 
of executive officers.” Seila L., 140 S. Ct. at 2213.  
 8. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591. 
 10. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Intriguingly, Justice Breyer has 
added the word “entire” to the Vesting Clause:  “Article II’s vesting of the entire ‘executive 
Power’ in a single individual [is] implemented through the Constitution’s structural separation 
of powers, and revealed both by history and case precedent.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 
710–11 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 11. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).  “Article II of the Constitution evidently contemplated . . . vesting 
general executive power in the President alone.” Id. at 135. 
 12. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 568–69 (1994).  Many scholars suggest that the Vesting Clause 
vests “all” the executive power in a president. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. 
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:  Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1153, 1203 n.244 (1992) (“Not only does the Vesting Clause of Article II grant all the 
executive power exclusively to ‘a President,’ but even the later provisions of Article II 
contemplate only presidential exercises of executive power.” (citation omitted)).  It is 
important to note how common it is for unitary scholars to add the word “all” to Article II’s 
Vesting Clause, even though only Article I’s Vesting Clause uses the word “all.” See, e.g., 
Calabresi & Prakash, supra, at 568–69. 
 13. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 588.  In another major unitarian article, the 
unitarians posit that Article II’s Vesting and Take Care Clauses “creat[e] a hierarchical, 
unified executive department under the direct control of the President . . . .  [Thus,] the 
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recent memo expanding presidential power over “so-called ‘independent’ 
agencies” based its argument on the Vesting Clause, repeating these same 
assertions of exclusivity:  the clause vests “the executive power in the 
President alone . . . Article II vests all of ‘[t]he executive Power’ in the 
President.”14 
One immediate problem:  the text of Article II’s Vesting Clause does not 
include the word “all”—or “sole” or “alone” or anything of the like.15  “The 
executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States.”16  The 
Framers used the word “all” elsewhere to convey entirety, such as in Article 
I’s Vesting Clause and in Article III on jurisdiction but not in Article II.  It is 
telling that textualists add words to the text, instead of noting their 
conspicuous absence (and citing expressio unius). 
Why are textualists adding missing (or excluded) words to constitutional 
texts?  Perhaps because the historical evidence for exclusive presidential 
removal is so thin and contradicted.  The Constitution is famously silent on 
removal, so unitary theorists rely more heavily on the First Congress of 1789 
than on the text of the Constitution or the debates of 1787–1788, which 
rejected unitary theory.17  In a pair of forthcoming papers, I show that the 
First Congress did not, in fact, adopt the ostensible Decision of 1789 and in 
 
President alone possesses all of the executive power.” Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 12, at 
1165 (footnotes omitted); see also Brief for Separation of Powers Scholars as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 3, Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 
(2020) (No. 19-7) [hereinafter Brief for Separation of Powers Scholars] (offering a statement 
on exclusivity of removal, signed by Calabresi, Prakash, and other unitarian scholars); 
STEPHEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 3 (2008); SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL 
FROM THE BEGINNING:  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 67, 82–83, 194–95 
(2015) (taking a more moderate stance on the Vesting Clause but asserting a general rule of 
exclusivity and reaffirming the Decision of 1789).  Professors Calabresi and Christopher Yoo 
make the same claim about the theory in The Unitary Executive:  “the Constitutional 
Convention was clear in its decision to grant all of the executive power,” as the Decision of 
1789 “definitively establish[ed].” CALABRESI & YOO, supra, at 35; see also Brief for 
Separation of Powers Scholars, supra, at 3–4; Saikrishna Prakash, Resolved, the Unitary 
Executive Is a Myth:  Con, in DEBATING THE PRESIDENCY:  CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
AMERICAN EXECUTIVE 25, 27 (Richard J. Ellis & Michael Nelson ed., 2014). 
 14. Extending Regul. Rev. Under Exec. Order 12866 to Indep. Regul. Agencies, 43 Op. 
O.L.C. 1, 8 (2019) (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 135). 
 15. See Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism:  The Case 
of Executive Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3, 23–25 (2018); Peter M. Shane, Prosecutors at 
the Periphery, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 241, 247 (2019); see also, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 
705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 17. In both Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 
477 (2010), and Seila Law, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “Since 1789, the Constitution has 
been understood to empower the President to keep officers accountable—by removing them 
from office, if necessary.” Seila L., 140 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 
483).  He continued, “The President’s power to remove—and thus supervise—those who 
wield executive power on his behalf follows from the text of Article II, [and] was settled by 
the First Congress.” Id. at 2191–92.  Chief Justices Taft and Roberts and Justices Thomas and 
Kavanaugh have similarly built their unitary theories as much on the legislative histories of 
1789 as the texts of 1787, if not more so. See id. at 2213; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 
114 (1926). 
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fact made a very different decision:  rejecting exclusive presidential removal 
by enacting a series of statutes giving removal power to judges and juries, 
along with relatively independent prosecutors.  These debates indicate that 
the First Congress was unpersuaded by James Madison’s reversal and the 
majority rejected his textual arguments for unitary presidentialism. 
And why were those textual arguments, which often cited Article II’s 
Vesting Clause, so unpersuasive to a wide majority of Congress?  Was the 
Constitution silent on presidential removal because it was clearly implied?  
Or because there was no consensus?  This Essay builds on some outstanding 
recent historical research relating to the Vesting Clause and removal, 
particularly by Professors Julian Davis Mortenson,18 Martin Flaherty and 
Curtis Bradley,19 Robert Natelson,20 Robert Reinstein,21 Peter Shane,22 
Jonathan Gienapp,23 Christine Kexel Chabot,24 Daniel Birk,25 and Jane 
Manners and Lev Menand26 that examines Article II’s Vesting Clause and 
helps reach the following conclusions:  it did not “vest” exclusive removal 
power, because the notion of “executive power” did not include a general or 
exclusive removal power and the word “vesting” did not convey indefeasible 
power in the eighteenth century. 
In some of the most recent pathbreaking work, it turns out that Marbury 
plays a central role as problem, solution, and—what I identify as—a new 
problem for the Vesting Clause debate.  Professors Daniel Birk and Jane 
Manners and Lev Menand identify a passage from Chief Justice John 
Marshall that has puzzled many: 
[W]hen the officer is not removable at the will of the executive, the 
appointment is not revocable, and cannot be annulled.  It has conferred legal 
rights which cannot be resumed. 
The discretion of the executive is to be exercised until the appointment 
has been made.  But having once made the appointment, his power over the 
office is terminated in all cases, where, by law, the officer is not removable 
by him. . . . 
 
 18. Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal 
Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169 (2019); Julian Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power 
Clause, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1269 (2020). 
 19. Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign 
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 553–56 (2004). 
 20. Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Constitution’s “Executive Vesting 
Clause”—Evidence from Eighteenth-Century Drafting Practice, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 1 
(2009). 
 21. Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259 (2009). 
 22. Peter M. Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
324 (2016). 
 23. JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION:  FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN 
THE FOUNDING ERA (2018). 
 24. Christine Kexel Chabot, Is the Federal Reserve Constitutional?:  An Originalist 
Argument for Independent Agencies, 96 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2020). 
 25. Daniel D. Birk, Interrogating the Historical Basis for an Unitary Executive, 73 STAN. 
L. REV. 175 (2021). 
 26. Jane Manners & Lev Menand, The Three Permissions:  Presidential Removal and the 
Statutory Limits of Agency Independence, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2021). 
2021] PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL 2089 
 . . . [A]s the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for 
five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not 
revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the 
laws of his country.27 
William Marbury was not an Article III judge.  He was a justice of the 
peace without life tenure, just a five-year term.  The statute establishing his 
office did not specify “good behaviour” or any removal conditions like “good 
cause.”  Why did Justice Marshall think he was not removable?  Some 
scholars debate whether this discussion was just dicta, but that question is 
minor.  Apparently President Jefferson and Madison agreed with Justice 
Marshall; if President Jefferson thought he could, he probably would have 
tried to moot the lawsuit by simply dismissing Marbury, with or without his 
precious commission.  Some have suggested that Marbury’s office as justice 
of the peace had special protection as a territorial office under congressional 
power28 or as an inferior office,29 but these points are speculative and not 
indicated by anything in Justice Marshall’s opinion.  Alternatively, a justice 
of the peace had a partially judicial nature, reflected in the office’s name, its 
historical mixed role, and its association with the Judiciary Act of 180130 and 
the “Midnight Judges.”  Perhaps Marshall was making a confused 
assumption that a judicial-like office would be insulated from removal.  
Although a justice of the peace was clearly not an Article III judge with 
lifetime tenure but rather one that held a five-year term, nevertheless 
Marbury’s counsel Charles Lee seemed to make such an assumption when 
he cited Federalist Nos. 78 and 79 on the importance of an independent 
judiciary and the necessity of Senate concurrence in removals (despite the 
ostensible Decision of 1789).  Lee argued that justices of the peace, “because 
they exercise a part of the judicial power, ‘ought . . . to be independent.’”31  
To be honest, these were my assumptions when I wrote my own article on 
this case, “Marbury and Judicial Deference”32 in 2002, in the context of 
vested property rights in judicial offices and the arguably more contentious 
fight over Federalist judges in the state courts.  One could imagine an 
emerging rule similar to a thin Humphrey’s Executor v. United States33 and 
 
 27. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803); see also Birk, supra note 25, 
at 187 n.68; Manners & Menand, supra note 26, at 25. 
 28. See C. B. Cross, The Removal Power of the President and the Test of Responsibility, 
40 CORNELL L.Q. 81, 83 (1954). 
 29. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 242 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“In 
Marbury v. Madison . . . it was assumed, as the basis of decision, that the President, acting 
alone, is powerless to remove an inferior civil officer appointed for a fixed term with the 
consent of the Senate; and that case was long regarded as so deciding.”); see also James E. 
Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1603 (2001). 
 30. Ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. 
 31. Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking:  Politics and the 
Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1110 (1988) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) at 151). 
 32. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Marbury and Judicial Deference:  The Shadow of 
Whittington v. Polk and the Maryland Judiciary Battle, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 58 (2002). 
 33. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
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its quasi-judicial category:  Executive offices are removable, but Congress 
can establish limits on presidential removal for significantly judicial, 
judicial-adjacent, or judge-like offices. 
I believe Professors Birk, Manners, and Menand have come very close to 
solving this Marbury puzzle as a bigger, bolder limit on presidential removal.  
Working in conversation with Manners and Menand, we submit that in 1789, 
the original public meaning was that this limited-term-of-years 
understanding against presidential removal applied to more traditionally 
executive offices, as well as quasi-judicial ones.34  This Essay finds that some 
of the gaps and questions left open by Professor Birk are addressed by 
Professors Manners and Menand, and it also adds some new answers, 
drawing from the congressional debates of 1789.  The main point of this 
Essay is to draw from the First Congress’s debate over presidential removal 
and Madison’s proposal for a “good behaviour” comptroller in June 1789, 
which reveals that the first Congress understood that a fixed term of years for 
an office meant that either an officer could not be removed or that removal 
could be limited by conditions similar to requirements of high crimes and 
misdemeanors, much like Chief Justice Marshall understood Marbury’s 
irrevocable job security. 
Together, I believe we offer an anti-unitary (a pluralistic? 
congressionalist?) answer for Marbury.  Taken together, this cadre of legal 
historians help explain the otherwise puzzling absence of removal and an 
explicit separation of powers clause in the Constitution:  removal power was 
mixed and shared between the legislature and the executive in the Anglo-
American tradition, which the Framers adopted as part of overlapping checks 
and balances, not hermetically sealed separation of powers.  And taking a 
step back, I note a fundamental incongruity in the unitarians’ assumptions:  
why would the Framers dramatically curtail the president’s appointment 
power relative to kings—who needed no parliamentary approval for the Privy 
Council and other executive officers—but then increase the president’s 
executive removal power relative to kings?  It makes more sense that 
Congress could impose limits like requiring “neglect of duty,” misbehavior, 
good faith, and good cause. 
Part I provides more background about Seila Law and the upcoming 
Collins v. Mnuchin35 and a summary of the Constitutional Convention, the 
ratification debates, and the First Congress, reflecting a mix of indecision and 
rejection of the unitary theory.  Part II focuses on the unitary scholars’ added 
 
 34. Professors Manners and Menand initially identified the comptroller debate as a 
possible source of this original public meaning circa 1789 but with a different interpretation 
of the context consistent with unitary removal. Manners & Menand, supra note 26, at 22–24.  
In conversation with them, I identified a different meaning of the debate against the unitary 
removal thesis:  that President Madison was not proposing “removal at the pleasure” of the 
president but good behavior removal, contradicting the unitary assumptions.  The 
collaboration and conversations with Professors Manners and Menand have been mutually 
beneficial.  In addition, I identified the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, as further 
evidence of this anti-unitary understanding. 
 35. 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 89 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. July 9, 2020) 
(No. 19-422). 
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word “all,” showing the opposite of what they intend—that one should infer 
from absence, rather than add and rewrite.  Part III explores whether 
executive power includes removal, via Marbury and Madison’s 
misunderstood proposal for an independent comptroller in June 1789.  Part 
IV summarizes some observations about the misunderstood word “vesting.” 
I.  THE DECISIONS OF 1787, 1788, AND 1789 
A.  Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Mnuchin 
v. Collins:  The Decisions of 2020 and 2021 
When Congress created the CFPB, it included a limit on the president’s 
removal authority for its single agency head:  “The President may remove 
the Director for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”36  For 
over 130 years,37 this has been roughly the formula Congress has used to 
protect the heads of independent agencies within the executive branch from 
politics, partisanship, or personal caprice.38 
The arguments in Seila Law and Collins focus on the common provision 
in statutes creating independent agencies that limit the president’s removal 
power to “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”39  They 
insist these provisions impermissibly violate separation of powers.  Indeed, 
the version of the “unitary executive” put forth by President Donald Trump, 
the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
shareholders would allow a president to fire any executive official for any 
reason—even personal reasons unrelated to the public interest—including 
any head of an administrative agency and the heads of “independent 
agencies,” like the CFPB, the Federal Reserve, the FTC, and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. 
In Seila Law, Chief Justice Roberts opened his analysis with a 
paraphrasing of the Vesting Clause—with the additional word “the”:  “The 
President’s power to remove—and thus supervise—those who wield 
executive power on his behalf follows from the text of Article II, was settled 
by the First Congress, and was confirmed in the landmark decision Myers v. 
United States.”40  But Chief Justice Roberts cited few historical sources, 
whether about the Vesting Clause, the Take Care Clause, the ratification 
debates, or from the First Congress in 1789.41  This is odd for an ostensibly 
historical argument.  One of the few original sources in Chief Justice 
Roberts’s decision was a letter from Madison, which he used to contend that 
“[t]he view that ‘prevailed, as most consonant to the text of the Constitution’ 
and ‘to the requisite responsibility and harmony in the Executive 
 
 36. 12 U.S.C. §  5491(c)(3). 
 37. See generally Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Dependent Origins of Independent 
Agencies:  The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Tenure of Office Act, and the Rise of 
Modern Campaign Finance, 31 J.L. & POL. 139 (2015). 
 38. See Manners & Menand, supra note 26, at 6. 
 39. 12 U.S.C. §  5491(c)(3). 
 40. Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191–92 (2020). 
 41. See id. at 2197. 
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Department,’ was that the executive power included a power to oversee 
executive officers through removal.”42  Unfortunately, most of Madison’s 
House colleagues rejected these arguments.  Chief Justice Roberts 
concluded:  “But text, first principles, the First Congress’s decision in 1789, 
Myers, and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accountability Oversight 
Board43 all establish that the President’s removal power is the rule, not the 
exception.”44  However, the text is far from clear and what Chief Justice 
Roberts means by “first principles” is even less clear. 
This line of cases and the Vesting Clause have become a foundation for 
other assertions of exclusive executive power.  These same historical 
questions shape the separation of powers and executive power debates in the 
even more high-profile cases over Trump’s tax documents:  Trump v. Mazars 
USA, LLP45 and Trump v. Vance.46  In the D.C. Circuit, Judge Naomi Rao’s 
dissent in Mazars also relied on Myers and Free Enterprise Fund.47  “[T]he 
reasonable construction of the Constitution must be that the branches should 
be kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended, and 
the Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than it 
affirmatively requires.”48 
In Seila Law, the Department of Justice asked the Court to overturn 
Humphrey’s.49  In addition, in 2021, the Roberts Court has another chance to 
overturn Humphrey’s via Collins, as the Department of Justice contests the 
similar structure of the Federal Housing Finance Agency.  On the D.C. 
Circuit, then judge and now Justice Brett Kavanaugh signaled his interest in 
revisiting and perhaps overturning Humphrey’s.50  Will the Roberts Court 
use the Vesting Clause this year to push its unitary theory that far? 
 
 42. Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), 
reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 890, 891 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Kenneth R. Bowling eds., 2004)). 
 43. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 44. Seilia L., 140 S. Ct. at 2206. 
 45. 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020). 
 46. 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020); see id. at 2437 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926)); Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 747–48 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 2019; 
id. at 780–81, 783 (Rao, J., dissenting) (first citing Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493; and 
then citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48 (James Madison)); Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 19-635) (citing Free 
Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 505–06) (discussing executive removal); Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13–14, Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (Nos. 19-715 & 
19-760) (“The Constitution entrusts the President with . . . nominating, appointing, and 
removing officers.” (emphasis added)); id. at 14 (discussing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 
714 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring), on the exclusivity of the Vesting Clause). 
 47. Mazars, 940 F.3d at 783 (citing Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493). 
 48. Id. at 781 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926)). 
 49. See Brief for Respondent at 16 n.2, Seila L., 140 S. Ct. 2183 (No. 19-7). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Jed Shugerman, Brett Kavanaugh’s Legal Opinions Show He’d Give Donald Trump 
Unprecedented New Powers, SLATE (July 19, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2018/07/brett-kavanaugh-would-give-donald-trump-unprecedented-new-
powers.html [https://perma.cc/EZX4-99ZP]. 
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B.  The Convention and The Federalist Papers 
Before digging into the Vesting Clause, it is crucial to understand that the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the ratification debates of 1787–1788 
did not come close to resolving the removal question.  If anything, the 
evidence from the Convention and ratification leans against the unitary 
interpretation and in favor of a congressional check.  This background is vital 
to understand the open-ended nature of the debate in the First Congress and 
the viability of the “congressional” and “senatorial” interpretations. 
The unitary theory relies on the Take Care Clause, but it is vital to read the 
full clause and its historical context:  “[The President] shall take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed.”51  The references to “care” and “faithfulness” in 
the Take Care Clause are both vague (what precisely are the standards of 
“care” and “faithful execution”?) and ambiguous (do these words mean to 
expand power or to limit it?).52  Chief Justice Taft relied on a president’s duty 
to take care as a constitutionally permissible basis for the president’s power 
to fire agency heads for any reason or no reason.53  However, the 
Constitution’s emphatic double command of “faithful execut[ion]”54 in the 
Take Care Clause and the presidential oath limits presidential discretion.55  
The word “faithfully” is a signal the Framers used to limit the exercise of 
presidential powers to good faith and bona fide purposes and fidelity to the 
public interest.  That signal is supported by six centuries of history leading 
up to the Framers’ choice to add this duty in the Constitution.56  This cluster 
of duties constrains the president with something similar to fiduciary 
duties.57  The Framers chose language emblematic of the oath of high- and 
 
 51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). 
 52. These clauses are both ambiguous (possible different meanings) and vague (imprecise 
meanings). See, e.g., William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 
(2019); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95, 97–99 (2010); Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language:  Some 
Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 509 (1994). 
 53. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926). 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3. 
 55. Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and 
Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2189–90 (2019). 
 56. Id. at 2141; see also Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary 
Constitutionalism:  Implications for Self-Pardons and Non-delegation, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 463, 466 (2019).  The scholars’ amicus brief in Seila Law arguing against the CFPB’s 
good cause protections takes an odd turn when it describes “Faithful Execution and Article 
II”:  “This argument fails, however, because it effectively transfers the duty to ‘take care’ from 
the President, to whom the Constitution gives such duty explicitly, to Congress.  The argument 
is simply a disagreement with the Constitution.” Brief for Separation of Powers Scholars, 
supra note 13, at 17.  “Faithful Execution and Article II” never suggested that the Take Care 
Clause empowered Congress to enact or specify “good faith” protections against removal.  
However, this Essay does.  Moreover, it is unclear why an amicus brief would purport that 
others with a different interpretation of an ambiguous clause are simply “disagree[ing] with 
the Constitution.”  This Essay suggests that neither the Constitution nor the First Congress 
supports this narrow orthodoxy. 
 57. “Fiduciary Constitutionalism, Corporate Defaults, and ‘Good Cause’ Removal,” my 
forthcoming paper with Ethan Leib, will suggest that Article II’s default removal rule is “good 
cause,” drawing on corporate default rules and founding-era public and private charters.  
Together, this research offers new evidence supporting Congress’s power to protect 
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mid-level ministers, not the royal coronation oath, which contained nothing 
like “faithful” execution—indicative of a more circumscribed scope of 
executive power.58  The “faithful execution” clauses thus indicate that the 
president is already bound to remove someone only for good faith reasons in 
the public interest, similar to how Professor Peter Strauss has relied on 
“faithful execution” to frame the president’s role as a limited “overseer,” not 
an interventionist “decider.”59 
The tenure of department heads did come up on the Convention floor.  
According to Madison’s notes on the Convention, Delegate Charles Pinckney 
proposed a long series of resolutions on August 20, 1787, including basic 
rules for each of the three branches, forerunners of the First Amendment on 
the press and the Third Amendment on quartering troops, and a habeas clause 
and other details.60  Delegate Gouverneur Morris, seconded by Delegate 
Pinckney, added an executive council of six department heads who would 
serve “during pleasure.”61  After debate focused on Delegate Pinckney’s 
proposals, the long slate was submitted to the Committee of Detail on August 
20, 1787.62  The Convention debates focused on Delegate Pinckney’s 
 
independent agencies.  The Framers understood the Constitution to be a kind of corporate 
charter and the default rule for corporate charters, if silent on removal, is that they implicitly 
empower removal—but the removal power is limited by good cause.  The Constitution is silent 
on executive removal, though it recognized impeachment as a mechanism of loss of office.  
Thus, the Constitution’s default rule for removal was a requirement of good cause.  Charters 
before and during the founding era frequently used the language of “neglect of duty” or 
“malfeasance” for removal powers.  Congress thus has a solid historical basis to translate, 
elaborate, or specify “good cause” as “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance” in a range 
of contexts.  This approach is consistent with the “essential” or “naturalistic” common-law 
approach from the 1789 debates. See GIENAPP, supra note 23, at 150–51, 153–54, 157.  See 
generally Kent Greenfield, Original Penumbras:  Constitutional Interpretation in the First 
Year of Congress, 26 CONN. L. REV. 79 (1993). Professors Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman 
used a similar fiduciary syllogistic argument for agency instruments and constitutional 
interpretation. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY:  
UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION 4 (2017). 
 58. Kent, Leib & Shugerman, supra note 55, at 2127–28, 2159. 
 59. Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?:  The President in Administrative Law, 
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 702–03 (2007); see also, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE 
PRESIDENT:  OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1957:  HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF PRACTICE AND 
OPINION 80–81 (4th rev. ed. 1957); Lawrence Lessig, Readings by Our Unitary Executive, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 175, 180 (1993); Shane, supra note 22, at 361.  For a similar concept of 
parallelism of delegation and supervision, see Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an 
Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Abner S. Greene, Discounting 
Accountability, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1489 (1997). 
 60. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 340–43 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
 61. Id. at 342–43. 
 62. The Journal of the Constitutional Convention indicated at the beginning of the day’s 
notes that the propositions “passed in the affirmative.” Id. at 334.  Why was this notation at 
the beginning of the day, not at the end, after debate?  Was this early note on a preliminary 
vote to open debate?  A vote on Delegate Pinckney’s propositions?  Or a vote on Delegates 
Pinckney and Morris’s propositions together?  The House adjourned after debating Delegate 
Pinckney’s proposals and then moved on to the question of debt the next day.  From Max 
Farrand’s collection of three sources, it remains unclear whether there was any vote 
specifically on Delegate Morris’s proposal, but it seems more likely that there was no debate 
and no vote on the details of it. Id. at 334–51. 
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legislative proposals and the language on treason; there appears to have been 
no debate on any of Delegate Morris’s proposals before the day adjourned 
and the debates turned to debt the following day.63  No one spoke for or 
against Delegate Morris’s proposal, but it was rejected in committee.  Charles 
Thach, who was otherwise sympathetic to presidential removal power, 
described the failure as “pro tanto an abandonment of the English scheme of 
executive organization.”64 
Turning now to The Federalist Papers, Madison wrote that Congress had 
significant power to shape executive offices and removal.  In Federalist No. 
39, Madison discussed removal of executive officers in a remarkably 
prolegislative, open-ended way: 
The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places, is, as it 
unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior.  The tenure of the 
ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal regulation, 
conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the State 
Constitutions.65 
Perhaps today the word “ministerial” has more of a connotation of inferior 
officers, but Madison was offering a dichotomy of judicial offices versus 
“ministerial” ones; thus he was more likely comparing the highest offices in 
each branch.  It is important to recall that the English used the word 
“minister” for their highest executive offices.  Thus, it seems Madison 
included principal officers as under “legal regulation” of tenure.  In 1789, 
Madison would clarify further in the direction of congressional power.  On 
May 19, 1789, Madison stated at the beginning of the department debates:  
“[I]t is in the discretion of the legislature to say upon what terms the office 
shall be held, either during good behaviour, or during pleasure.”66  And in 
the treasury debates, he proposed good behavior tenure for the comptroller.67 
The Federalist Papers alternately emphasized separation of powers and 
the overlap necessary for checks and balances.  Checks and balances work 
only if there are overlapping powers and not siloes.  Separation of powers 
depends on checks and balances and vice versa.  But Madison’s titles are 
instructive as to his own priorities:  Federalist No. 48 is titled “These 
Departments Should Not Be so Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional 
 
 63. Id. at 340–50. (Aug. 20, 1787). 
 64. CHARLES C. THACH JR., CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789:  A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 125 (1922). 
 65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 209 (James Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., Chicago, Scott, 
Foresman & Co. 1898). 
 66. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 389–90 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).  Madison also 
acknowledged that the states had a mix of approaches to removal generally, including 
legislative powers over removal.  On the references to state practices, William Loughton 
Smith, the leading supporter of the impeachment-only view, said, “I have turned over the 
constitutions of most of the states, and I do not find that any of them have granted this power 
to the governor.” Id. at 490. 
 67. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), reprinted in 16 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 890, 891 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Kenneth R. Bowling eds., 2004) [hereinafter 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
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Control over Each Other.”68  The title of Federalist No. 51 is “The Structure 
of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between 
the Different Departments.”69  Functional overlap was vital for Madison’s 
system.  The nonexclusivity of presidential appointment, in favor of Senate 
advice and consent, and the nonexclusivity of congressional legislative 
power, in favor of the presidential veto, are two examples of checks and 
balances, rather than exclusivist separation. 
Perhaps it is because of this emphasis on overlapping checks and balances 
that the Framers did not add a separation of powers provision to the 
Constitution.  Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia all included explicit 
separation provisions in 1776, followed by Massachusetts in 1780 and New 
Hampshire in 1792.70  Did Madison and the Framers deliberately omit such 
a clause to avoid separation formalism and instead invite checks and balances 
functionalism? 
Alexander Hamilton took a more checks and balances approach of 
overlapping removal powers, too.  In Federalist No. 77, Hamilton wrote: 
The consent of [the Senate] would be necessary to displace as well as to 
appoint.  A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion 
so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the Government as 
might be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices.71 
Thus, Secretary Hamilton, a well-known supporter of strong executive 
power, nevertheless had presumed the Senate would be coequal with the 
president on “displacing”—that is, removing—officers.  In the middle of the 
removal debates in the House in 1789, Secretary Hamilton announced that 
he had changed his mind,72 but one year after that, he successfully proposed 
a proto-independent commission, the “sinking fund,” for purchasing debt,73 
which by statute included as members the chief justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the vice president—neither of whom were removable by the 
president, though they were granted executive power. 
It is also worth noting that Madison acknowledged in the 1789 debates that 
he initially favored the Senate removal position:  Madison said his “original 
impression” was that “the same power which appointed officers should have 
the right of displacing them”—i.e., the Senate.74  “But on examining the 
 
 68. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 65 (James Madison). 
 69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 65 (James Madison). 
 70. MD. CONST. of 1776, para. VI; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XXX; N.C. CONST. 
of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, para. IV; N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt.1, art. XXXVII; VA. 
CONST. of 1776, BILL OF RIGHTS, § 5. 
 71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 65, at 419 (Alexander Hamilton) (footnote 
omitted); see also Jeremy D. Bailey, The Traditional View of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77 
and an Unexpected Challenge:  A Response to Seth Barrett Tillman, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 169 (2010).  But see Seth Barrett Tillman, The Puzzle of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77, 
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 149–54 (2010). 
 72. GIENAPP, supra note 23, at 154. 
 73. See Chabot, supra note 24, at 3–4.  
 74. Congressional Intelligence:  House of Representatives, DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.), 
June 18, 1789, reprinted in 11 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note at 67, at 845, 845–
46. 
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constitution by its true principles,” he also changed his mind.75  If one is 
looking for clear original public meaning, Madison all by himself took all 
three major positions (senatorial, congressional, and presidential) and was 
more consistently congressionalist from 1787 through 1789. 
C.  The Indecision of 1789 
One reason it is so important to reexamine the text of the Vesting Clause 
is that it is the historical context on which the Supreme Court arguably relies 
more than any other evidence; in this context, the Decision of 1789 does not 
stand up to scrutiny. 
The unitary theory relies heavily on the Decision of 1789.  This may be 
because of the Constitution’s notable silence on removal and the vagueness 
and ambiguity of these clauses.76  However, the three statutes establishing 
the U.S. Departments of Foreign Affairs (now the Department of State), War 
(now the Department of Defense), and the Treasury were also deliberately 
ambiguous about whether the president has the power to remove.  Thus, the 
unitary theorists rely heavily on a fragmentary legislative history—the House 
debates and voting patterns—to interpret the statute’s ambiguous text as 
implying a constitutional basis for removal power.77  In a forthcoming paper, 
I offer six overlooked moments from 1789 that dispel unitary assumptions78: 
(1) The Decision of 1789 was actually a strategic ambiguity, a wily 
switch from an explicit grant of power to an ambiguous contingency clause, 
because Madison and the presidentialists lacked support in the House and 
Senate.  Explanatory clauses were common for Madison and the First 
Congress but here, Madison steered in the opposite direction.  His allies 
acknowledged their switch was a strategy to “obtain the acquiescence” of the 
Senate.79  House opponents called this move a retreat and questioned its 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. “Since 1789, the Constitution has been understood to empower the President to keep 
executive officers accountable—by removing them from office, if necessary.” Free Enter. 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accountability Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010) (citing Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).  “This ‘Decision of 1789’ provides ‘contemporaneous and 
weighty evidence’ of the Constitution’s meaning since many of the Members of the First 
Congress ‘had taken part in framing that instrument.’” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723–
24 (1986) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983)); see also Parsons v. United 
States, 167 U.S. 324, 332 (1897) (observing that the Decision of 1789 provides the “settled 
and well-understood construction of the Constitution”).  The Supreme Court also narrowed its 
reading of the Decision of 1789 and permitted more congressional latitude in Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).  For other cases examining the Decision of 
1789, see Parsons, 167 U.S. 324; United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 
284 (1854).  There are robust arguments about the constitutional significance of the First 
Congress and the Decision of 1789. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 52, at 61; Michael Bhargava, 
The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court’s Use of History, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1745, 
1777 (2006). 
 77. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 12, at 1165. 
 78. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The First Congress Rejected Unitary Presidentialism:  
The Indecisions of 1789, Strategic Ambiguity, and Removal by Judiciary (Fordham L. Legal 
Stud., Working Paper No. 3596566, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3596566 [https://perma.cc/W7SG-S67N].  
 79. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 608 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
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integrity.  The debates and votes suggest that only one third of the House 
supported Madison’s theory, but a majority likely voted for the final bill 
because the clause was sufficiently unclear and malleable, and it was more 
important to move forward on an urgent legislative agenda. 
(2) A senator’s diary (overlooked by unitary scholars and the Supreme 
Court) shows that a majority of the Senate indeed opposed the bill—until 
political deals appear to have swung two or three votes.  Critics emphasized 
the bill’s confusion and its “illy concealed [design].”80  Sponsors, however, 
seem to have implied the clause had no “design” against the Senate’s power 
and that the House’s intent was irrelevant.  The diary suggests that the bill’s 
supporters followed through on a strategy of ambiguity and confusion, 
instead of clarifying the text. 
(3) A tale of two Roberts:  two scandalous finance ministers served as 
context for independent checks on executive power.  In the shadow of 
“Robinarchy” self-dealing, the first Congress focused on the dangers of a 
corrupt president who would abuse at-pleasure removal power to raid the 
treasury and build a “throne.” 
(4) Justices have asserted that the First Congress decided officers served 
“at will,” but very few members of Congress spoke in favor of presidential 
removal at pleasure in 1789.  The First Judiciary Act and the debate over the 
treasury indicate Congress did not think “at will” was the rule for removal.  
Members discussed the justiciability of for-cause removals in the English 
writ tradition, suggesting an oversight role for Congress and the courts. 
(5) In the treasury debate, Madison’s comptroller proposal was 
understood as “good behavior” tenure, revealing a lack of consensus about 
removal conditions.  Modern judges, including Chief Justice Roberts in 2010 
and 2020, have misunderstood Madison. 
(6) The Treasury Act’s81 anticorruption clause established removal by 
the judiciary, empowering relatively independent prosecutors and judges to 
check presidential power.  Congress frequently enabled judicial removal over 
the next fifty years. 
A majority of the first Congress opposed the powers cited by unitary 
theorists (the constitutional basis for presidential removal power and offices 
held “during pleasure”).  On whether the president had exclusive removal 
power, the First Congress decisively answered no. 
Perhaps because the historical record from 1789 is so weak, and because 
the Vesting Clause is so short and vague, the unitary theorists feel the need 
to add words to it, like the word “all.” 
II.  “ALL” THE PROBLEMS  
The judges and scholars who find an exclusive presidential removal power 
in the Constitution cite two clauses from Article II:  (1) the Executive Power 
or Vesting Clause:  “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
 
 80. 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 67, at 118 (July 18, 1789). 
 81. Act of Mar. 3, 1809, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 535. 
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the United States”;82 and (2) the Take Care Clause:  the president “shall take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”83  This Essay is not a deep dive 
into the textual and historical arguments, but it does highlight the basic 
textual problems in The Federalist Papers if one is claiming a formal and 
exclusive presidential removal power generally and “at pleasure” removal 
specifically. 
The word “all” appears in Article I’s Vesting Clause (“All legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress”84) but not in Article II 
or III’s Vesting Clauses,85 raising some questions about executive 
exclusivity.86  Article III’s Vesting Clause does not include the word “all,” 
but the word is used repeatedly in Article III to convey exclusive 
jurisdiction.87  The Article I Vesting Clause’s addition of “herein granted” 
gives a possible answer to this issue.88  Yet it is worth noting the absence of 
the word “all”—and the unitarians’ nontextual insistence on inserting it 
anyway.89  As noted above, in his lone dissent in Morrison, finding the 
independent counsel a violation of the Executive Power Clause, Justice 
Scalia wrote, “[T]his does not mean some of the executive power, but all of 
the executive power.”90  Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts’s first sentence of 
constitutional analysis in Seila Law also added the word “all” to Article II’s 
Vesting Clause:  “Under our Constitution, the ‘executive Power’—all of it—
is ‘vested in a President.’”91  Professor Victoria Nourse calls this addition 
“pragmatic enrichment.”92  The expressio unius canon might suggest that 
 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 83. Id. § 3, cl. 1. 
 84. Id. art. I, § 1. 
 85. Id. art. II, § 1 (“The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States 
of America.”); id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”). 
 86. See THACH JR., supra note 64, at 138; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 575; 
Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 12, at 1185, 1193 n.204; Peter L. Strauss, The Place of 
Agencies in Government:  Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
573, 583–86, 598 (1984).  For more thorough discussion of “all,” see Akhil Reed Amar, A 
Neo-Federalist View of Article III:  Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. 
L. REV. 205, 224, 252 n.151 (1985); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
747, 762 (1999). 
 87. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 88. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 12, at 1186, 1193 n.204.  But see generally 
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996). 
 89. Many scholars suggest that Article II’s Vesting Clause vests “all” the executive power 
in a president. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 12, at 1203 n.244 (“Not only does 
the Vesting Clause of Article II grant all the executive power exclusively to ‘a President,’ but 
even the later provisions of Article II contemplate only presidential exercises of executive 
power.” (citation omitted)).  It is important to note how common it is for unitarians to add the 
word “all” to Article II’s Vesting Clause, even though the word does not appear in the text of 
Article II’s Vesting Clause, while Article I’s Vesting Clause does use the word “all.” See, e.g., 
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 568–69. 
 90. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 91. Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191 (2020) (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 1). 
 92. Nourse, supra note 15, at 4, 23–24; Shane, supra note 15, at 247; see also, e.g., 
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705. 
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adding the word “all” belies and disguises the significance of its absence.93  
Justice Scalia taught that it is common sense to attribute meaning to 
conspicuous absences.94 
Some scholars have offered solid explanations for why Article II’s Vesting 
Clause did not imply powers beyond those named explicitly in Article II.  
Some unitary theorists argue that Article II was simply listing exceptions to 
full presidential control (e.g., treaties and war powers needed congressional 
support).  Professors Bradley and Flaherty respond that Article II listed 
powers that were entirely presidential:  the power to require written opinions, 
the pardon power, and the ambassadorial receipt power.95  Given that Article 
II offers examples of such executive powers, Bradley and Flaherty note that 
the expressio unius canon indicates that their list was complete, “rather than 
merely illustrative.”96  They also note that Article III’s Vesting Clause, which 
is textually the same as Article II’s, is followed by a list of judicial powers 
that are interpreted to be exclusive, even if one can imagine that “judicial 
power” in the English tradition could have referred to additional powers.97 
Consistent with this interpretation, I would add that Madison cautioned 
against such an approach of finding expansive implied powers.  During the 
Convention, he indicated that the scope of executive power was limited to 
the textually explicit powers, “ex vi termini”98 (i.e., from the force of the 
word or boundary, by definition).  Madison agreed with Delegate James 
Wilson’s suggestion that executive powers “are designed for the execution 
of Laws, and appointing Officers” and further added that “executive 
powers ex vi termini, do not include the Rights of war & peace &c. but the 
powers sh[ould] be confined and defined—if large we shall have the Evils 
of elective Monarchies.”99  Madison echoed these statements in The 
 
 93. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/legal/expressio%20unius%20est%20exclusio%20alterius 
[https://perma.cc/4A96-LBPM] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021) (“[W]hen one or more things of 
a class are expressly mentioned others of the same class are excluded.”). 
 94. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1998). 
 95. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 19, at 556; see also A. Michael Froomkin, The 
Imperial Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1346, 1363 (1994). 
 96. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 19, at 555. 
 97. Id. at 557 (“As Alexander Hamilton notes in Federalist No. 80, after he recites Article 
III’s list of cases and controversies, ‘This constitutes the entire mass of the judicial authority 
of the Union.’  If Articles II and III are to be treated the same, this may suggest that the powers 
referred to in Article II should be construed as exhaustive, not illustrative, of the President’s 
authority.” (footnote omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 65, at 488 
(Alexander Hamilton))).  Professors Bradley and Flaherty are responding to Professors 
Calabresi and Rhodes. See Calabresi & Rhodes supra note 12, at 1176; see also Kansas v. 
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 81–82 (1907); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power 
Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377 (1994).  For further arguments against the unitary 
interpretation, see Froomkin, supra note 95, at 1352–53. 
 98. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 60, at 70. 
 99. Id.  In his dissent in Myers, Justice James Clark McReynolds explained that ex vi 
termini signifies a principle of enumeration and a rejection of implied executive powers.  If 
executive powers were not stated explicitly, they were not granted. Myers v. United States, 
272 U.S. 52, 205 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (“In the proceedings of the 
Constitutional Convention no hint can be found of any executive power except those definitely 
enumerated or inferable therefrom or from the duty to enforce the laws.”). 
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Federalist Papers:  in Federalist No. 14, he wrote that the national 
government “is limited to certain enumerated objects,”100 and in Federalist 
No. 45, “The powers delegated to the federal government are . . . few and 
defined.”101  Madison’s arguments at the Convention and the ratification 
debates are a caution against finding any implied executive powers in Article 
II. 
Nevertheless, it seems formalists on nondelegation are willing to highlight 
Article I’s use of the word “all” when it advances these inclusions; and 
exclusions arguably have implications:  Article I’s vesting of “all” suggests 
more exclusivity than Article II’s, and its “herein granted” phrase suggests a 
more limited vesting of enumeration.  The use of “all” in Article I signifies 
formally exclusive legislative power; its absence in Article II signifies 
perhaps more functionalism or more exceptions.  This textual distinction—
the “all” in Article I—would seem to bolster the textual case for the 
nondelegation doctrine.  In fact, in his Gundy v. United States102 dissent that 
previewed a sea change in this area, Justice Gorsuch implicitly distinguished 
the “all” in Article I from its absence in Articles II and III.103  If one 
emphasizes the “all” for formalism in the Article I nondelegation context, 
consistency seems to demand some opposite effect in an Article II context. 
In a forthcoming paper, I show that the 1787 Constitution, the 1781 
Articles of Confederation, and other early charters used the words “sole,” 
“alone,” and “exclusive” when they sought to convey sole and exclusive 
powers.104  Similarly, Professor Blake Emerson has observed that the 1787 
Constitution itself used the word “sole” when it meant exclusivity in the 
impeachment clause105:  “The House of Representatives shall chuse their 
Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of 
Impeachment . . . .  The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments.”106  Emerson noted, “It seems that when the drafters wanted 
to make a grant of power exclusive, they knew how to say so.”107 
As another paper in my series will explain, there is a historical reason and 
logic for more exclusivity about legislative power than executive power:  
prosecution and administration were so decentralized in early modern 
England and the United States, a mix of private prosecution and government 
 
 100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, supra note 65, at 77 (James Madison). 
 101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 65, at 278 (James Madison). 
 102. 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
 103. “In Article I, the Constitution entrusted all of the federal government’s legislative 
power to Congress.  In Article II, it assigned the executive power to the President.  And in 
Article III, it gave independent judges the task of applying the laws to cases and 
controversies.” Id. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 104. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781; see also Jed Handelsman Shugerman, 
“Vesting”:  Text, Context, Dictionaries, and Unitary Problems (Fordham L. Legal Stud., 
Working Paper, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3793213 [https://perma.cc/83F8-5TRS]. 
 105. Blake Emerson (@BlakeProf), TWITTER (Jan. 8, 2021, 4:38 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
BlakeProf/status/1347659077136961536?s=20 [https://perma.cc/Z9WU-2CDE]. 
 106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
 107. Emerson, supra note 105. 
2102 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
prosecution that crossed federal-state boundaries.108  It turns out that there 
was tremendous flexibility about relying on state governments to execute 
federal law,109 as well as some question about the role of federal judges in 
supervising district attorneys, U.S. attorneys, and marshals.110  Given this 
fluidity, it makes sense that the Framers had concluded that “all” the 
executive power would be exclusively the president’s if state officials, 
judges, and private prosecutors would play a role in executing the law. 
III.  MADISON’S COMPTROLLER 
William Blackstone, an eighteenth-century English jurist, identified 
appointment as a royal prerogative (and one that also fits the “executive 
power” that Professor Mortenson more carefully identified), but he did not 
mention removal.  Blackstone wrote in his Commentaries about the royal 
prerogative “of erecting and disposing of offices.”111  In the context of the 
paragraph, “disposing” appears to mean “at his disposal”—for disposing 
them to his subjects—rather than disposing of the offices, as in removal or 
dissolution.  In the same passage, he wrote “honours are in the disposal of 
the king.”112  Blackstone did not mention removal specifically in discussing 
the king’s powers.  Perhaps the recent scholarship helps us understand why 
Blackstone says nothing about executive removal power and why the 
Constitution says nothing about executive removal power. 
First, it is not at all obvious that the English had a distinct conception of 
“executive removal,” as opposed to all other forms of removal, when they 
did not even have a modern American doctrine of separation of powers.  
More precisely, there was “removal,” and there were different institutions 
charged with removal power over different roles.  For instance, Parliament 
had a form of removal power in impeachment and the courts had a role in 
removal through writs of scire facias, quo warranto, and mandamus.  And of 
course, there was also the problem that kings could not remove peers or lords.  
And over time, as Professors Manners and Menand have shown, kings could 
not remove judges or officers with a limited term of years.113  It makes sense 
 
 108. See Shugerman, supra note 104. 
 109. Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement:  Some Lessons 
from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 281 (1989).  “Congress vested jurisdiction in state courts 
over actions seeking penalties and forfeitures, granted concurrent jurisdiction to state courts 
over some criminal actions, and assigned state officials auxiliary law enforcement tasks.” Id. 
at 303.  “Despite the executive branch’s leading part, Congress, the courts, private citizens, 
and state officials have played significant supporting roles in federal criminal law 
enforcement.” Id. at 281; see also JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTION:  THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 83 
(2012); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 
HARV. L. REV. 49, 70 (1923); Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and 
Criminal Statutes:  Development in Judicial Federalism, 60 HARV. L. REV. 941, 966 (1947). 
 110. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice:  
Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121, 131–34, 153–
54, 167, 170 (2014). 
 111. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *272. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Manners & Menand, supra note 26, at 33–34. 
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that Blackstone did not mention removal as a royal prerogative or right 
because an eighteenth-century English lawyer would not recognize that the 
king had a general “removal” power, and an eighteenth-century English 
lawyer would not have had a conception of “separation of powers” to identify 
and separate out an “executive removal” power or an exclusive removal 
power. 
Professors Manners and Menand trace back to the eighteenth century the 
origins of “neglect of duty” and “malfeasance,” which today are the for-cause 
removal standards for modern independent agencies.114  Professor Birk also 
documents removal standards of “neglect of duty . . . or other just Causes” 
for Scottish Court of Exchequer officers in 1707,115 “neglect of duty” for 
coroners in 1751,116 and “[i]nability, or for other just Cause,” for constables 
in 1756,117 as part of a surprising degree of pluralism about offices and tenure 
in early modern England.118  However, each of these offices had a judicial, 
or at least a judicial-adjacent role, Justice Scalia’s Morrison dissent 
notwithstanding. 
Professor Birk powerfully reminds us that not only is the past a different 
country, but also that England is a different country.  A limited monarchy 
bargaining with a landed aristocracy is a very different country than one that 
rejected monarchy decisively.  Something has gotten lost in translation.  In a 
mixed monarchy/aristocracy, English kings consolidated power and used 
appointments to create heritable honors and offices as property rights, often 
held in fee or held for life.119  The classic example was peerages, but 
Professor Birk shows that the practice extended to more functional 
government offices.120  However, one gap in Professor Birk’s study is that 
most of his examples come from the fifteenth through the seventeenth 
centuries, and he acknowledges the curtailment or abolition of many of these 
practices in the late seventeenth century.121  Perhaps England was 
modernizing from a feudal aristocracy to a hierarchical administrative state 
and, as such, was strengthening the hand of a central government after a 
century of civil war.  Then Professor Birk offers more examples from the 
1780s, which seem to coincide with questions about King George III’s 
stability.122  Most of these examples seem too early or obsolete or too late to 
influence the Framers.  The other problem is that most of these offices had 
some mixed judicial role:  chancery, exchequer, attorneys general, solicitors 
general, sheriffs, coroners, and justices of the peace.  To his great credit, 
Professor Birk acknowledges that most of these offices had a judicial 
 
 114. Id. at 29. 
 115. Exchequor Court (Scotland Act) 1707, 6 Ann. c. 26, § 4 (Scot.). 
 116. Coroner’s Act 1751, 25 Geo. 2 c. 29, § 6 (Eng.). 
 117. Westminster Act 1756, 29 Geo. 2 c. 25, §§ 1, 6 (Eng.). 
 118. Birk, supra note 25, at 223–24.  
 119. Id. at 204–05. 
 120. Id. at 205–06. 
 121. Id. at 206–08. 
 122. Id. at 204–08. 
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function,123 including the sheriffs, coroners, and justices of the peace.124  
This is not surprising in a medieval or early modern system of local elites 
playing mixed roles in maintaining the peace.  His argument is that they had 
enough executive function to count for executive purposes.125  However, that 
approach does not solve our problem when trying to translate English mixed 
powers and practices to the United States with its newfangled separation of 
powers.  Conversely, these offices were judicial enough to fit into a norm 
expressed by Marbury’s lawyer, Charles Lee:  judicial independence, with or 
without a life-tenured Article III judgeship.126  The existence of a partial 
judicial role could explain an exception to a more general rule of royal 
removal. 
Translating from English practice to the United States, Professors Manners 
and Menand fill in those gaps by finding that, surprisingly, when an office 
had a term of years but no removal conditions, the rule was that those offices 
were not removable.127  Modern readers assume presidential removal at will, 
but it turns out English practice provided a different administrative system 
with different default rules.  Crucially, Professors Manners and Menand pick 
up where Professor Birk left off, finding this rule in effect for more clearly 
executive offices in treasury/finance, in colonial America and mid-
nineteenth-century America.128  The question remains from their evidence 
from the late colonial period, the founding, and the early republic:  most of 
these offices or treatises relate to the same kinds of semijudicial offices that 
Professor Birk identified.129  In Marbury, attorney Charles Lee and Chief 
Justice Marshall still could be read as endorsing this property rule but 
arguably only for judge-like offices.  What seems to be missing is a clear 
statement of this default rule for relatively nonjudicial executive offices in 
the United States in the founding era. 
 
 123. Id. at 208–09, 208 n.199. 
 124. Professor Birk writes of the justices of the peace: 
Although they exercised a local judicial jurisdiction, presiding over the Quarter-
Sessions, they were also law enforcement officers, charged with keeping the peace 
and executing national laws.  As to this latter function, Parliament vested the Justices 
of the Peace with significant administrative and regulatory authority.  Statutes 
instructed them to execute laws related to infrastructure, the environment, public 
health and safety, and prisons, as well as to assess taxes, administer the poor laws, 
set wages and prices, and license wine retailers and alehouses. 
Id. at 209 (footnotes omitted).  Professor Richard Tompson describes justices of the peace as 
“[a] combination of police inspector, magistrate and county councilor.” Richard S. Tompson, 
The Justices of the Peace and the United Kingdom in the Age of Reform, 7 J. LEGAL HIST. 273, 
273 (1986). 
 125. Birk, supra note 25, at 208–09, 208 n.199. 
 126. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 151 (1803). 
 127. Manners & Menand, supra note 26, at 33–34. 
 128. Id. at 38–45. 
 129. Id.  Examples include a colonial Pennsylvania sheriff and coroner; New York’s 
justices of the peace, county court judges, sheriffs, and coroners; and Massachusetts’s, North 
Carolina’s, and perhaps New Hampshire’s justices of the peace. Id.  As noted above, all of 
these offices had a semijudicial role in England and possibly also in the United States.  
Professors Manners and Menand offer some stronger evidence from Samuel Chase. 
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Inspired by Professors Manners and Menand, I offer one—or maybe 
three—such examples:  the widely misunderstood debate over the 
comptroller in June 1789, plus two similar speeches in the First Congress.130  
It was none other than Madison who reflected this norm and his colleagues 
who opposed his proposal confirmed this understanding:  they argued against 
Madison’s limited-year term precisely because they understood that this 
formula, as a matter of inherited practice, meant tenure “during good 
behaviour” and would have limited presidential removal as its default rule.  
Chief Justice Roberts misunderstood this comptroller debate in Seila Law 
because of his unitarian assumptions.  Former judge Michael McConnell 
repeats the same assumptions in his 2020 book, The President Who Would 
Not Be King.131 
I confess that I did not understand why Madison’s interlocutors assumed 
he was proposing “good behaviour” tenure until I read Professors Manners 
and Menand’s analysis on Marbury and nineteenth-century sources and 
applied the same context to the comptroller.  I also found similar legal 
explanations about offices held for limited years offered elsewhere in the 
1789 debates by Representatives John Laurance132  and Samuel 
Livermore.133 
There has been a long-standing historical puzzle in Marbury:  why did 
Chief Justice Marshall conclude that President Jefferson could not withhold 
the office from Marbury?  And why did President Jefferson and Madison 
fight out a commission if President Jefferson could have simply removed 
Marbury at will?  Professors Manners and Menand answer that the 
Federalists enacted the justice of the peace offices with a term of five years—
apparently deliberately—to protect Marbury and their other midnight 
appointments in the District of Columbia from presidential removal 
power.134  Why would they have gone to such trouble to create these offices 
if everyone assumed that President Jefferson could remove the officers the 
day after his inauguration?  Thus, the Federalists reflect the same 
understanding about fixed terms as unremovable property in the office, 
unless the statute specified a power of removal. 
The lingering question is whether all of these assumptions would be 
consistent with a rule that applied only to judicial, judge-like, or judicial-
adjacent offices.  If so, presidents would still have removal power over 
predominantly executive officials.  As noted above, Professors Manners and 
Menand offer significant evidence before and after this era, but there appears 
to be a gap in their evidence about whether the founding generation 
understood the rule to apply to more traditionally executive offices.  It turns 
 
 130. Professors Manners and Menand generously acknowledge my interpretation. See id. 
at 22 n.129. 
 131. MICHAEL MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING:  EXECUTIVE 
POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 166–67 (2020). 
 132. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 500–05 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 133. Id. at 564–66.  Thanks to Professors Manners and Menand for helping interpret this 
statement. 
 134. Manners & Menand, supra note 26, at 6 n.23. 
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out that the First Congress—and James Madison himself, along with some 
of his colleagues—offers such evidence in the debate over the comptroller 
from June 1789. 
The complicated debate about the comptroller has produced much 
confusion over the years.  In the treasury debates, Madison and his colleagues 
confirmed that a term of years implicitly meant tenure during good behavior.  
On June 29, 1789, Madison proposed the following language:  “the 
comptroller should hold his office during years, unless sooner removed by 
the president.”135  Modern readers have assumed that this removal was at 
will, mainly because it is difficult to set aside our modern assumptions.136  
Secondarily, for those who assume a unitarian 1789, it is difficult to read 
Madison’s pro-presidential speeches on foreign affairs in mid-June, and then 
a week later, and argue that he shifted to antipresidential views regarding the 
treasury in late June. 
But, in fact, the presidentialism of his foreign affairs speeches137 from June 
16 to June 22 was actually the aberration in this era.  First, as noted earlier, 
Madison told Delegate James Wilson during the Convention that he believed 
the scope of executive power was “ex vi termini,”138 “confined and defined,” 
 
 135. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 636 (emphasis added). 
 136. Brief for Separation of Powers Scholars, supra note 13, at 24 (“But he did not propose 
any restriction on the President’s removal power; to the contrary, he proposed that the 
Comptroller be appointed for a relatively short term, ‘unless sooner removed by the 
President.’” (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 636).  To their credit, Professors Prakash and 
Mashaw acknowledge that Madison was proposing more secure tenure for the comptroller but 
each misunderstood it.  Professor Jerry Mashaw, while understanding Madison’s proposal to 
mean increased job security, also overstated the proposal:  “Because of this authority to 
determine individual appeals, James Madison suggested that the Comptroller should not hold 
office subject to presidential removal, but should be given a term of years.” Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Recovering American Administrative Law:  Federalism Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE 
L.J. 1256, 1285 (2006).  Madison’s proposal explicitly gave the president a power of removal, 
but it was the term-of-years language that limited that power.  For an analysis of Professor 
Prakash’s arguments, see infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 137. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 473–98. 
 138. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 60, at 70.  Madison’s perspective seems to shift 
modestly back and forth from 1787 to 1789, from more openness to congressional power to 
more emphasis on presidential power—and back again. See infra Part II.B; see also David S. 
Schwartz and John Mikhail, The Other Madison Problem, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033, 2076–
77 (2021).  Such a shift should give pause to originalists who focus on original public meaning 
circa 1787 because Madison’s arguments in 1789 and thereafter may reflect his changing 
political interests over time, rather than his recollecting a consensus from 1787 to 1788. See 
generally MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND:  REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION (2015) (discussing Madison manipulating records and recollections in the early 
republic to suit his political agenda).  It is possible that Madison’s views did not change much 
after all, and he was simply more focused on rejecting Senate control over removal, a proposal 
that he had not addressed before.  But it is also possible that he shifted his views as the republic 
came into shape after many compromises in the Convention and leaders could observe a new 
balance of power.  Perhaps Madison’s increased support for presidential power after 1787 to 
1788 was traceable to the trust of President George Washington or a desire to ingratiate 
himself to Washington.  Or he shifted in order to win his surprisingly difficult race to win a 
House seat against James Monroe and his anti-Federalist backers (we know he changed his 
mind on a bill of rights in this race), and he needed Washington’s support to keep winning this 
district.  Or he saw himself as needing to protect his Virginia constituents and slavery, as it 
became clear that Virginia, by far the most populous state, with 20 percent of the population, 
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and did not include implied powers,139 as Justice James Clark McReynolds 
explained in Myers.140  In Federalist No. 39, Madison wrote, “The tenure of 
the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal regulation.”141  On 
May 19, 1789, Madison repeated his endorsement of legislative control:  “[I]t 
is in the discretion of the legislature to say upon what terms the office shall 
be held, either during good behaviour, or during pleasure.”142 
Instead of recognizing Madison’s more thorough congressionalism, jurists 
and scholars have read his comments in isolation.  Thus, they miss that the 
rest of the debate clarified that Madison was proposing tenure “during good 
behaviour” for the comptroller, a Senate-confirmed executive office.  This 
episode puts Madison in a new light.  Many have noted how he previewed 
the quasi-judicial justification for independent agencies, but it is vital to read 
the full debate to see that Madison:  (1) rejected the notion that the House 
had settled on at-pleasure tenure as the rule,143 (2) was a more consistent 
 
had much more control over presidential politics than it had over the Senate.  Madison may 
have understood more clearly that Virginia’s interests lined up more with a strong president—
who was more likely to come from Virginia due to the Electoral College—than with the 
Senate, which was stacked in favor of the small states.  But the rest of the 1789 debate might 
also be a cautionary tale. 
 139. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 140. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 205 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
 141. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 65, at 211 (James Madison).  Earlier in Federalist 
No. 39, Madison wrote: 
[W]e may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government 
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; 
and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited 
period, or during good behavior. 
Id.  The first sentence is not precisely about the Constitution, but it embraces a range of 
republican tenures.  It seems more likely that by “administered,” Madison meant any office, 
and each form of tenure tracks the range of legislative, executive, and judicial offices:  “[a] 
limited period” relates to Congress and the president; “good behavior” to judges and the 
president; and, depending on one’s interpretation, “pleasure,” or any of the three, to executive 
offices under the president.  In light of Madison’s discussion of congressional discretion over 
“ministerial” offices, he seems to have been leaving a door open to all three.  The next passage 
creates some confusion:  “[T]hey hold their appointments by either of the tenures just 
specified.” Id. (emphasis added).  Does his use of “either” suggest a dichotomy:  during 
pleasure for a limited period versus good behavior?  The answer is almost certainly no, given 
the breadth of the paragraph and its likely description of legislative offices.  But this 
trichotomy, including the nonremovability of limited-term offices, seems to have been the 
understanding about options for executive offices in the First Congress. See Shugerman, supra 
note 78; see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 338–39 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851) (interpreting the first 
Congress making “at pleasure” the default but also suggesting that Congress could add a 
limited term of years to prevent any power of presidential removal); Manners & Menand, 
supra note 26, at 19 (citing 3 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW, BY A 
GENTLEMAN OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE 732 (1740)). 
 142. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 389–90 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).  Madison also 
acknowledged that the states had a mix of approaches to removal generally, including 
legislative power over removal.  On the references to state practices, William Loughton Smith, 
the leading supporter of the impeachment-only view, said, “I have turned over the 
constitutions of most of the states, and I do not find that any of them have granted this power 
to the governor.” Id. at 490. 
 143. Id. at 636; see infra Part II.B. 
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skeptic of the unitary model, and (3) warned specifically about presidential 
corruption of the treasury. 
Starting from presidentialist assumptions, the ensuing debate appears 
contradictory and incoherent.  Unitary scholars claim that Madison’s 
colleagues were “baffled”144  and reacted with “incredulity.”145  Indeed, to 
modern readers with presentist assumptions about offices, Madison’s 
language is confusing.  But to the contrary, all of the debate participants 
understood that this proposal was for “good behavior” tenure, and the best 
explanation is that they immediately knew what a term limited to a fixed 
number of years legally implied. 
IV.  MARBURY AND VESTED RIGHTS? 
Perhaps Marbury solved one problem but opens another question:  did 
“vestedness” mean a special legal protection from being revoked?  Chief 
 
 144. Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 
1070 (2006).  Professor Prakash was confused about Madison’s proposal, given that it is 
difficult for modern readers to set aside our presentist assumptions.  He thought it was “at 
odds” with a judicial analogy, but that is because he missed the “good behaviour” context of 
the early modern law of offices during a term of years.  To his credit, Professor Prakash 
recognized that Madison was protecting the comptroller, and this was constitutionally 
significant: 
Despite the equivocal nature of this episode, it suggests that the Decision of 1789 
did not encompass the conclusion that the President had the power to remove all 
officers of the United States lacking constitutionally granted tenure . . . .  Though 
we cannot say how many members of the majority would have sided with Madison 
on this issue, there is no doubt that a split existed.  Given the division on Madison’s 
withdrawn motion, it is impossible to say that the Decision resolved the removal 
question regarding officers who are neither Article III judges nor executive officers. 
Id. at 1071–72.  Even after Professors Manners and Menand have explained the different 
context of that era—and how it continued into ours—originalists still have trouble grasping 
this different historical framework.  In a short critique of Professors Manners and Menand, 
Professor Ilan Wurman argues, “[M]oreover, their own evidence suggests that a fixed term 
with no removal would have been understood to be unconstitutional:  for the first one hundred 
years, Congress almost always added to statutory provisions providing for fixed terms the 
proviso, ‘unless sooner removed by the president.’” Ilan Wurman, In Search of Prerogative, 
70 DUKE L.J. 93, 143 n.205 (2020).  Professors Manners and Menand point to a significant 
1801 statute that established Marbury’s office and the one recognized by Chief Justice 
Marshall as providing no removal power in Marbury. See An Act Concerning the District of 
Columbia, ch. 15, § 11, 2 Stat. 103, 107 (1801); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
138 (1803).  Professors Manners and Menand also cite United States v. Cooper, 4 U.S. (4 
Dall.) 341 (1800).  In addition to Professors Manners and Menand’s evidence, Joseph Story’s 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States and Madison’s Federalist No. 39 and 
arguments in 1789 also lend support to their interpretation. See generally STORY, supra note 
141; THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note  65 (James Madison).  A valid research question is 
how often Congress created similar fixed-term offices without a removal provision.  
Interestingly, Professor Wurman does not interrogate a constitutional basis for “at pleasure” 
versus “at will” removal beyond this footnote but just asserts that the removal power is 
“indefeasible.” Wurman, supra, at 144.  But elsewhere in amicus briefs, Professor Wurman 
makes assumptions about the term “unless sooner removed by the President” in other statutory 
contexts, by assuming it meant “removable at will.” See infra Part III.C.  However, this 
episode shows that these assumptions about the use of this phrase do not line up with the 1789 
understanding. 
 145. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 652. 
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Justice Marshall wrote: “[Marbury’s] appointment was not revocable; but 
vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the laws of his 
country.  To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the 
court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right.”146 
Marbury reminds us of the vested rights doctrine in the Marshall Court, as 
it recognized Marbury had a “vested right” to his office that the president 
could not revoke.147  Was this language a link from the vested rights 
doctrine—indefeasible property excluding legislative interference—to the 
Constitution’s “vested powers”—exclusive indefeasible powers excluding 
Congress and judicial interference?  It is hard to find any unitary scholar 
making this connection explicitly, but perhaps this connotation influenced 
Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts, and others to add the word “all” to 
Article II’s Vesting Clause.  Unitary scholars use the words “exclusive” and 
“indefeasible by Congress” when talking about presidential removal 
power,148 words that are associated with the vested rights doctrine.  It appears 
that they assume a connection between these concepts. 
The first problem is that historians trace the vested rights doctrine, as a 
constitutional limit on legislative powers, to the early nineteenth century.  
The English common law had a notion of “vested rights” but in a common-
law system without constitutionalized meaning.  Instead, “vested rights” 
were in contrast to future interests and conditional interests.  In eighteenth-
century England, offices could become “vested” in this property sense, so 
that the king or another officer could not remove them from the office 
unilaterally.  But this sense of “vesting” property from executive removal 
was fundamentally different from vesting the property from any legislative 
changes or conditions.  This constitutionalized meaning evolved in a new 
legal system of written constitutions limiting legislative power over contract 
and property. 
Marbury reflects this English sense, a limit on executive discretion, while 
empowering the legislature over the executive:  Congress had the power to 
create a nonremovable office, limiting the president’s power to remove.  
Nothing in Marbury indicates that Congress could not abolish the office.  In 
fact, Stuart v. Laird149 indicates that the Marshall Court accepted the 
congressional abolition of Article III judgeships.  Marbury itself did not 
indicate that the phrase “vested rights” meant a limit on legislative power, 
but the Marshall Court used it that way soon after in Fletcher and Trustees 
of Dartmouth College.150 
Could this connotation be read back into the use of “vested” with respect 
to powers a few decades earlier?  As I have found, the era’s dictionaries and 
eighteenth-century documents suggest this reading is an anachronistic 
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projection.  As textualist critics warn, legislative history is “like entering a 
crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s 
friends.”  Perhaps the unitary scholars have read a party of mid-nineteenth-
century cases on contracts and property discussing “vested rights” and 
believe they are representative of eighteenth-century constitutions.  My 
forthcoming study of eighteenth-century dictionaries and sources questions 
those assumptions.  There is little evidence of “vesting” making a leap from 
property rights to powers with anything like a meaning of indefeasibility and 
exclusivity. 
Only in the early nineteenth century did the language of “vested rights” 
emerge clearly in a constitutional/anti-legislative context, borrowing from 
the notion of present rights that were not contingent; but instead of the 
contingency of events on property title and fee simple, for example, the new 
contingency was against Parliament and imperial infringements.151  Chief 
Justice Marshall seems to have been using “vested” in the sense that 
Marbury’s property was not a contingent or conditional future interest 
awaiting delivery of a commission but was already legally protected 
regardless of delivery.  Chief Justice Marshall did not use the word “vested” 
with respect to congressional powers and in fact deferred to Congress’s 
power over even judicial offices in Stuart.152  The vested rights doctrine does 
not seem to have been around long enough to have shaped the original public 
meaning of “vested” as exclusive. 
My next paper in this series explains how the Constitution did not assign 
many traditional English executive powers to the president and that the word 
“vest” did not have the exclusive or indefeasible meaning assumed today, 
drawing from the era’s dictionaries, colonial charters, and early state 
constitutions.153  For example, if the Vesting Clause implicitly delegated 
“all” traditional executive powers solely to the president, it requires some 
gymnastics to explain the shared appointment, war, and treaty powers and 
also the lack of prorogue and dissolution powers.  One surprising finding was 
how the word “vested” was almost never used in colonial charters, and then 
it suddenly emerged in some, but not all, early state constitutions, and yet the 
word was not used in a context of exclusivity or unconditionality.154  Based 
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on a search of dozens of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century dictionaries and 
databases, “vest” was simply defined as “possess,” and if dictionaries, both 
legal and general, offered a legal context, it was in simple terms about 
property.  Dictionaries overwhelmingly used the word “vest” in a less robust 
context, and many legal dictionaries did not include entries at all for the word.  
This next paper, titled “Vesting,” also examines the use of the word in the 
Articles of Confederation155 and the 1787 Constitution,156 finding only a 
limited meaning.   
Professor Mortenson made an observation about the word “executive” as 
“semantic drift,” as separation of powers developed and became reflexive 
and assumed.157  In a similar dynamic, lawyers and judges conflate the word 
“vested” as an eighteenth-century basic property rights doctrine with a 
nineteenth-century constitutional doctrine, and even then, the doctrine was 
about irrevocable property in holding offices, not irrevocable official powers 
over offices.  It took some time to have written constitutions to produce a 
robust sense of constitutional law and to have judicial review of statutes to 
borrow such a term from the timing of property contingencies from a non-
judicial-review context.  This semantic drift then becomes constitutional drift 
as the unitary theorists assume, perhaps subconsciously, that “vested rights” 
can be read back into “vested powers.”  This linguistic move is 
understandable, but it appears anachronistic.  If one simply notes that the 
word suddenly appeared in U.S. state constitutions in 1776 without much 
context and then reads the Articles of Confederation and dictionaries from 
the era, one cannot claim a clear original public meaning for the vesting 
clauses beyond a simple statement of possession and no evidence of 
“indefeasibility.” 
CONCLUSION 
Taken together, this cadre of legal historians help explain the otherwise 
puzzling absence of removal and an explicit separation of powers clause in 
the Constitution:  removal was mixed, shared, and subject to legislative 
regulation in the Anglo-American tradition, and the Framers adopted it as 
part of overlapping checks and balances, not hermetically sealed separation 
of powers.  And taking a step back, I note a fundamental incongruity in the 
unitarians’ assumptions:  why would the Framers dramatically curtail the 
president’s appointment power relative to kings—who needed no 
parliamentary approval for the Privy Council and other executive officers—
but then increase the president’s executive removal power relative to kings?  
It makes more sense that Congress could impose limits like requiring 
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“neglect of duty,” misbehavior, good faith, and good cause.  Such an 
interpretation fits the larger project of this symposium: to excavate the 
original federalist, republican, democratic Constitution, stripped of the 
ahistoric royalism of the unitary scholars’ assumption and projections. 
